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Abstract: The goal o f  the essay is to articulate some beginnings for an empirical approach 
to the study o f  agency, in the firm conviction that agency is subject to scientific scrutiny, 
and is not to be abandoned to high-brow aprioristic philosophy. Drawing on insights from 
decision analysis, game dieory, general dynamics, physics and engineering, this essay will 
examine the diversity o f  planning phenomena, and in that way take some steps towards 
assembling rudiments for the budding science, in the process innovating (parts of) a 
technical vocabulary. The key is focus upon the organization o f  effort in time. This paper 
categorizes forms o f  organization o f  effort in time, and yields an analysis o f  both individual 
agency and coalitions o f  agents as forms o f  effort organized in time. Finally, it articulates 
precise questions pertaining to the natural (evolutionary) history o f  forms o f agency (once 
upon a time referred to as ‘Will’) that we now find on the ground.
Introduction
Planning has recently come in for considerable philosophical 
approbation, indeed as something an entity must perform in order to 
qualify as fully rational. (This is collateral to something that has been 
accepted for some time: that having projects, and especially long-term  
projects, renders an entity worthy o f more— or at any rate of different 
types of— moral consideration, particularly when it comes to matters of 
public policy.) Facets o f planning have come to be viewed as marks of 
rationality itself, if not of morality too, bearing (or so they have been 
saying recently) on whether it is ever rational (and furthermore 
advisable) to make promises and issue threats. I shall argue here that the 
case for planning has been inflated, fundamentally as a result o f too 
grandiose a conception of its place (or more precisely, lack of it) in 
nature: it is instead misconceptions o f planning as a natural 
phenomenon that have wrought the highfalutin language that carries 
with it the favored morals about rationality in the first instance, and
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accordingly the preferred doctrines about due moral consideration. For 
planning, as a matter o f  cognitive activity whose function is to attain a 
goal, stands at one end o f  a spectacularly diverse but otherwise quite 
orderly continuum o f  natural possibilities for self-organization, many o f  
them quite humble. Collecting all these under one schema or taxon for 
systematic study will be our task here, undertaken in service o f  eventually 
illuminating the natural history o f  Will, without wrenching it stillborn 
from  its natural context and casting upon it the fluorescent light o f  high­
brow analysis.
The study o f  planning is still in its infancy, with some roots in (on one 
side) decision analysis, game theory, general dynamics, and com puter 
science, and other roots (on another side) in behavioral ecology and 
other social sciences. This essay will take some steps towards assembling 
rudiments for this budding science, innovating (parts of) a technical 
vocabulary, but drawing on ideas that can be found already in physics, 
engineering, econom ics and decision analysis. The key is to focus upon 
the organization o f  effort in time. This paper categorizes forms o f  
organizing effort in time, and yields an analysis o f  both individual agency 
and coalitions o f  agents as forms o f  effort organized in time. Finally, it 
articulates precise questions pertaining to the natural (evolutionary) 
history o f  forms o f  agency (once upon a time referred to as ‘Will’) that we 
now find on the ground.
The goal o f  the essay is to articulate some beginnings for an empirical 
approach to the study o f  agency, firmly committed to the idea that 
agency is subject to scientific scrutiny, and not to be abandoned to high­
brow aprioristic philosophy. Aprioristic analyses o f  agency systematically 
fail to take natural facts about organismic development, risk and 
distribution o f  control over numerous sites o f  behavior seriously. And 
while the instincts o f  some scientifically-minded theorists (predominantly 
economists) would be to try to make do without a metaphysic o f  agency, 
this project will aim at a much more sophisticated— and, more
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importantly, empirically-minded— metaphysic, alert to a full range o f  
natural possibilities within a realistic evolutionary setting.1
Navigating a dicey world
When an assembly—whether o f  many, or simply an assembly o f  one—  
convenes to devise a plan o f  action in relation to some novel situation, or 
vis-a-vis some ongoing aspect o f  life rife with risk, that assembly is 
recognizing the call for action. This ability to recognize the call for 
action is an aspect o f  practical wisdom. T o  be practically wise is to 
exercise sensitivity to guidance— an appreciation o f  features o f  the world 
that call for specific behaviors— in such a way as serves a purpose, goal or 
end. The end may be one that the wise one aspires to inherently 
(through organic necessity, perhaps), or an end that the wise one comes 
to aspire to through possessing a susceptibility to guidance. (This latter is, 
in com m on parlance, the deliberate activity o f  setting goals). But what 
exactly does susceptibility to guidance amount to? I will refer to this as 
the capacity for navigation.
What is navigation? Hunting behaviors o f  predators from  every' 
phylum o f  the animal kingdom  certainly qualify as inspiring pieces o f  
navigation— m ore so when these predators work in packs. But then so do 
the many foraging and predator-evading behaviors o f  herbivores. Some 
maneuvering in relation to predators, on  the part o f  prey, draw attention 
in a big way, on account o f  being elaborately organized, and are 
successful at least partly because they do. This is the provenance o f  
animal herding. Consider for example the flocking o f  birds. Throughout 
his life, field naturalist Edward Selous struggled to explain the 
astonishing synchrony and coherence o f  m otion in a starling flock, a 
swarming mass o f  insects, or a sweeping, twisting school o f  tiny silvered 
fish. He concluded in 1905 that ‘ [t]hey must think collectively, all at the 
same time, or at least in streaks or patches— a square yard or so o f  an
1 I am grateful to Don Ross, both for the suggestion o f  the roadmap, and for (roughly) this 
way o f  characterizing the way on it.
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idea, a flash out o f  so many brains’ (as quoted by Couzin, 2007). It would 
be easy to conclude that, for lack o f  more scientifically respectable 
notions, Selous yielded to the seductive temptations o f  the disreputable 
idea o f  a collective mind, a Victorian notion imbued with immoderate 
romantic fascination. But this judgm ent would do a disservice to the 
insights towards which he was groping. As we will eventually put it, birds 
in formation (N o f  them, say) have reduced their degrees o f  freedom  from 
some multiple o f  N to something considerably smaller. And this is the 
navigational marvel that Selous sought to grasp. How is this marvel o f  
navigation accomplished?
A  starting thought is that only organisms with mobility— with the 
capacity for displacing themselves in space— can benefit from  or display 
an ability to navigate. But this is not obviously the case. A  Venus Flytrap 
plant might not be navigating in this most robust sense o f  the term. Still, 
it is taking some initiative in service o f  its survival: it prepares a trap 
well in advance and waits for it to be triggered. Then it takes appropriate 
‘action’ to process its catch when that action is called for. (Similar 
remarks will apply to a human being who suffers from pervasive 
paralysis.)
Navigation is thus not easily demarcated. Still, one wants to say that 
an organism cannot navigate if it can take no initiative o f  any kind. But 
what, in turn, is initiative? I shall for purposes o f  this study say that 
initiative is a matter o f  having one’s behavior organized along a timeline 
so that it serves a goal. The key here is ‘organized’ ; this qualifier ensures 
that meeting the goal in question is not merely an accidental 
happenstance. But the notion o f  organization does not require that the 
behavior in question be premeditated in keeping with some soap- 
operatic paradigm— it does not require a capacity for that mental activity 
o f  reasoning in means-ends style that can under the right conditions 
earn an entity the label o f  ‘devious.’ Indeed it may require no mental 
activity o f  any kind. If successful, therefore, this account will amount to 
(at least the rudiments of) a theory o f  navigation, conceived as behavior 
organized in service o f  a goal. The principles o f  analysis will apply to all
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organisms with interests to promote, from  the most non-deliberating to 
the most deliberate about their goals. In other words, it shall constitute 
the fundaments o f  a very general theory o f  goal attainment, and 
therefore o f  agency, that applies to the deliberate and the indeliberate 
alike.
Navigating in time
There are two important and distinct things that go into the exercise o f  
initiative. The first is the control scheme under which effort is exerted, and 
which gives the initiative an authorial structure— a structure that allows 
us to assign, in as fine and feature-sensitive a fashion as we insist upon, 
responsibility for actions, contrivances and collusions. We shall not 
devote much space here to illuminating the conceptual underpinnings o f  
this feature, though we shall have a few words to sav about how authorial 
structure interacts with the second feature o f  the exercise o f  initiative.2 
This second feature is the actual shape that the effort itself takes in time. What 
we shall undertake here is illumination o f  this idea o f  ‘the shape o f  effort 
in time’ . This idea is one that is discussed by professionals in the 
disciplines o f  management and long-term planning, and involves the 
framing of, and taking steps toward meeting o f  goals. Discussions in 
management texts are lacking in rigor. We shall here attempt to supply 
some o f  that rigor.
Meeting goals through investment o f  effort is a matter o f  working 
according to a timeline or schedule, and in such a way as is sensitive to 
developments that impact task com pletion. And so we require looking 
carefully at how goals are met along a timeline or schedule in such a 
manner. What is it to be so organized as to serve or enhance the attainment, 
° f  g oals on a schedule? This is the question we shall endeavor to assemble 
tools for answering. It will turn out that there are a number (probably 
quite a small number) o f  ways o f  being so organized. These will
2 A fuller account o f  authorial issues can be found in Thalos (2007), which builds upon 
Norman and Shallice (1986) and Hardcastle (1995).
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correspond to ways o f organizing one’s resources as an agent— indeed, 
they correspond to ways o f organizing oneself as an agent. (Hence the few 
words that must be said about authorial structure along the way.) They 
are thus ways o f agenthood. These ways will include organization as a 
coalition o f separate individuals, not necessarily even all belonging to 
the same species.
Consider an early specimen o f homo sapiens, after a juicy bit o f rabbit 
with a rock, spear or bow and arrow. An even earlier specimen or 
ancestor o f the species might not have gone after fast-moving targets, 
and was just content to wander in search o f roots, berries and easy prey. 
Upon the specimen we are now considering— the more evolved 
specimen— the planning that goes into successful projectile hunting 
surely confers fitness advantages. Hunting requires planning because 
once a projectile has been launched, there can be no correction for 
errors— no adjustment to developments in progress. If the arrow fails its 
mark, the quarry is lost, and with it a hefty investment o f  time and 
precious metabolic energy. Someone might nonetheless insist that 
planning is not involved in the hurling o f a projectile; it is all simply a 
matter o f honing largely unconscious skill. Never mind. The only point I 
am making is that this skill, conscious or otherwise, that goes into 
projectile hunting—whatsoever we choose to call it— is different from 
what is involved in an episode o f hunting the quarry down on foot or by 
hand (drawing on raw brawn and speed), different still from what is 
involved in extracting and preparing nutritious but initially poisonous 
roots, and different still yet from what is involved in cultivation o f  land 
for production o f  hand-selected crops. For in the latter, contrasting 
cases, feedback is available throughout the process, in such a way as allows 
adjustments (although in the last case the time frame is so long as to call 
for a separate analysis o f  the skills involved). There is time enough to 
adjust for errors made, or unforeseen turns o f  events. But in the case o f 
an arrow sent through the air, no adjustment is possible.
Hunting with a projectile is a matter o f managing one’s efforts in 
such a way that potential infelicities o f every sort are catered for before
T o w a rd  a N atural H istory  o f  G oa l A tta inm ent 295
they actually arise. It is a matter o f packaging one’s efforts in advance. 
This front-loading technique or capacity— as I propose we refer to it— is a 
means o f compensating for the unavailability (or, more precisely, the 
unusability) o f feedback. And as such this capacity is thorough-going 
future oriented. Small wonder it serves as the cinematic paradigm of 
planning. And it requires a large and special metabolic investment in the 
capacities— cognitive and otherwise— that render it possible.
O f course, as what we’ve said already will have already indicated, not 
all o f  the ways o f being organized conforms to the front-loading pattern. 
Some, like that involved in agriculture, is required because the time 
interval between the time o f inauguration or investiture, and the time 
the goal is reached, is so large. What’s more, there’s always an 
opportunity to modify the plan: feedback is available, as well as the 
opportunity for large or minute adjustments. A plan, in these instances, 
will be your present self s way o f coordinating with past and future selves. 
I propose to refer to this pattern as the coordination pattern.
This is essentially the difference between the philosopher Michael 
Bratman’s account o f planning (1987, 1999, 2000a), and that o f David 
Gauthier (1994, 1997). Bratman’s account is front-loading, inspired by 
the future orientation model exemplified in projectile hunting. 
Gauthier’s coordination account is by contrast focused upon examples 
where planning is conducted as a means o f  coordinating with all o f one’s 
temporal parts, past and future, in a way that is open to numerous 
adjustments along the way, as a way o f  taking advantage o f the benefits— 
as well as a way o f compensating for the disadvantages— o f having 
through no fault o f one’s own to distribute one’s agentic efforts across 
time. Gauthier is thus able to take advantage o f  (or, more honestly, 
create) the opportunities for precommitment where feasible, whilst these 
advantages weigh in much less heavily for Bratman.
Obviously, successful navigation in a given circumstance might 
require one or the other o f  these planning strategies, either exclusively 
or each in correct measure: some cases require more front loading, 
others more coordination o f past and future selves, and yet others only
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one but not the other. And so a skilled navigator (that ideal, possibly 
purely imaginary organism), equipped with both capacities, has to select 
a strategy that befits the circumstance, whilst also seeking to compensate 
for the disadvantages inherent in having to make a selection at the point 
o f need in the first place (for example, the costs in time and cognitive 
resources). Once— if ever— a capacity for strategy selection (whatever 
term we wish to use for this, additional, executive function) comes on the 
scene, it will be called upon— and stretched— to perform such work ever 
more efficiently. And upon cases where an agent simply cannot be both 
future-oriented and compliantly coordinative with all o f one’s selves in 
time— theories that identify practical wisdom with just one or the other 
o f these too functions, will o f course end up in disagreement amongst 
themselves.
The surviving question, once we’ve acknowledged all this, must be: 
Can the demands between the potentially diverging strategies o f pure 
future-orientation, on the one hand, and that o f coordination, on the 
other, be reconciled— or, better yet, combined into a higher-order 
strategy? .And if they cannot be combined, can there be an even higher- 
ranking planning function— an executive o f some sort—that selects 
between them on a case-by-case basis, in a cost-effective way? If so, what 
does that value-adding executive function itself look like? If not, how can 
a balance be struck in advance o f seeing the actual cases o f choice on the 
ground?
I do not pretend any answers to these questions o f substance here. 
But before we leave the matter, we must also examine whether there 
might not be other strategies that recommend themselves to the 
practically wise. If there is front loading, might there not also be back­
loading, a strategy in which one commits to an action path whose full 
outcome is partly determined by at least one further action taken by the 
agent or turn o f events down the road? (Numerous real-life contracts— 
like, for example, wills—work along these lines.) This back-loading 
strategy is somewhere intermediate between front-loading and the 
coordinative strategy, and whether it is available in real-life situations is
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really an empirical matter—a matter o f whether agents extended in time 
can avail themselves o f ‘contracts’ o f the right sort, in the ecological 
context, and if not, whether these things can be self-engineered by the 
agents who would avail themselves o f them.
We shall not go in search o f further ways o f organizing agency, but 
will leave further examinations to others. Still, it bears mentioning that 
these ways will vary according to whether multi-tasking is available, 
whether tasks and their processing are distributed across sites o f  agency, 
and (if distributing is chosen) how processing is actually distributed. And 
so there is an important point to be made in connection with the 
question o f patterns o f organizing agency: it is interlinked with the 
question o f  how the claims and duties o f  self, are ranked against the 
claims o f groups to which one belongs, and even against the possibly 
diverging claims o f sub-personal parts or features o f a single self (one’s 
knees versus one’s heart, say, in the matter o f  whether and how to 
engage in physical exercise). The question o f how agency is organized 
therefore interlinks with the question o f whether there is a unit o f 
agency, amongst those entities interacting in any given instance, whose 
ends or welfare must be ranked highest (and further, how that ranking 
itself is accomplished). And this issue is sure to have bearing on the 
question: among all the shapes that planning can take, is one to be 
preferred— practically, morally, or otherwise— to all the others?
The preponderance o f philosophical thinking, conducted in the 
aprioristic style characteristic or our philosophical era, would suggest 
that the answer to this last question must be an affirmative. But a 
naturalistic or empiricist stance would advise that we examine whether 
the choice among options might be entirely a matter o f  ecology: if 
circumstances are such that front-loading pays better or plays better, 
then we should find a preponderance o f front-loading among agents in 
nature. And if neither is universally better, we should expect a 




The remainder o f my remarks require formulating an interconnected set 
o f technical terms. These terms will allow us to articulate an account o f 
goal attainment: opportunity structure, choice, dilemma, action point/node, 
action path and outcome. I will say that action is called for at certain action 
points or nodes, that these are organized in structures o f  opportunity, that an 
agent makes a choice in a dilemma when the action point in which that 
agent finds herself admits o f more than one outcome, and that the actual 
outcome depends upon which action path the agent takes.
o2 o4
time1 < < time 2
Figure 1: A  hypothetical structure (T ^ )
Let us refer to structures o f  opportunities also as decision trees, and 
name a tree by a sequence o f (numbered) action or decision points or 
nodes, corresponding to a time-indexed sequence o f  opportunities for 
choice. The choice situation depicted abstractly in Figure 1 is therefore 
T u2. On this way o f  referring to decision trees, T 2 is another tree, 
depicting an imbedded opportunity or dilemma, and is therefore 
related to T 1_2 as follows: T 2 c  Tj_2. Let us refer to actions or action
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paths chosen (or deserving to be) as solutions; the solution sets o f  T,.2 
we can denominate as ‘S(T,.2),’ making no commitment as to whether 
that set contains a unique element. An element o f  a solution set will be 
an action path, consisting o f  a sequence o f  actions a,- - a - - ... - an. Let us 
say that S(T) c  S(R) — that is to say that the solutions overlap—when two 
conditions hold: (1) T  c  R, and (2) sequence S(T) matches the relevant 
part o f sequence S(R).
Principles and solution concepts
Here are two principles for identifying genuine solutions to navigation 
problems conceived simply as means-ends problems. Each has been 
endorsed, in one way or another, in formal decision theoretic literature.
1. Principle o f  maximal outcome: When choosing between two or more 
paths o f  action at a node n, the only relevant features o f the 
choice are the sequences o f outcomes o, associated with each 
action path future to n.
We might think o f this as a form o f consequentialism. This principle is 
another way o f putting the point that the solution concept we are after 
here is a solution concept to a problem conceived purely as a means-ends 
problem. And it advises that we aim at the best option when taking action.
A second principle goes like this:
2. Principle o f  separable choice: When choosing at the initial node 
between courses o f  action that involve taking subordinate 
actions at different points in time (for example, between a, - a} - ak 
and at - am- an), the solution at time0 shall contain, as subordinate 
sequences, the solution at subsequent nodes considered as 
independent decision trees. Generalizing and putting into 
symbols: for every' tree or subtree T  and R o f  a choice dilemma, 
if T  c R ,  then S(T) c  S(R).
This second principle is purely formal. It is purely a statement o f the 
formal principle (true or false, as it may be, when it comes to real-life
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opportunity structures) that an embedded dilemma is a dilemma in its 
own right. Adopting this principle within a theory o f practical wisdom 
amount to embracing the formal idea that the solution to an embedded 
dilemma must be a component o f the solution o f the dilemma in which it 
is embedded.
It is worth noting here that this principle o f separable choice, as a 
solution concept, coincides exactly with the game theorist’s notion o f 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in the multi-player case) pioneered by 
Reinhard Selten. This point will help us draw certain parallels later on.
Now, are these two principles compatible? This is an intriguing 
question in its own right. And answering it amounts to deciding how to 
conceive o f the project o f individuating dilemmas— of categorizing 
decision problems. Put another way around, it amounts to deciding 
which dilemmas or decision problems we want our account to address as 
if they were identical. Obviously, if the two principles are not 
compatible— if, that is to say, they lead to divergent (or more precisely, 
non-overlapping) solution sets o f the same dilemma—we cannot 
combine them. And so we shall have to decide between them, at least 
should it turn out that no principle more appealing still presents itself. 
And we shall have to name the grounds for our preference among all 
eligible principles, in any case— to justify a choice among competing 
solution principles.
Now, some writers defend separable choice, others reject it on the 
grounds that it violates the (purportedly self-evident) principle that we 
must always aim at the best.3 There is some reason to think that the 
principle o f separable choice is required to allow for working backwards: 
if, at the initial point o f deliberation, the agent facing a dilemma can 
foresee what course o f action will rationally be chosen at a future node, 
this might provide a reason for working out what to choose on nodes 
closer to the point o f deliberation.4 Game theorists refer to deliberations
3 Bratman (1987, 1999) defends it, and Gauthier (1994, 1997) and McClennen (1990, 
1992) reject it.
4 McClennen (1992, 1990) gives no attention to this matter.
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that incorporate such lines o f reasoning, as backwards induction. For a 
trivial example, suppose that I know I will prefer (for logistic reasons) 
not to drive to the grocery tomorrow, but that I must secure groceries 
either today or tomorrow, this might be a decisive reason to go today. 
But this form o f reasoning can’t go through unless I suppose that the 
solution to my dilemma o f  whether to go the grocery today or tomorrow, 
must overlap with the solution to the (possibly hypothetical) choice I 
shall face tomorrow once I’ve settled the issue today. This way, the 
principle o f separable choice makes certain solution or solution 
procedures possible. But it conflicts with the principle o f  aiming at the 
best option. Here is how.
Toxin
A representation o f Gregory Kavka’s toxin puzzle results if we conceive 
o f the structure depicted in Figure 1 as a dilemma for a single individual 
who has to take action at both nodes 1 and 2. The agent in question has 
received a credible offer that pays one million dollars tomorrow morning 
if, at midnight tonight, the agent manages to produce a genuine 
intention to drink a vial o f vile and sick-making, but ultimately harmless 
toxin tomorrow afternoon. The agent receives the prize whether or not 
the toxin is actually drunk tomorrow (Kavka, 1983). The action called for 
at node 1 is the formation o f an intention (in this case, to drink a toxin: 
aj intends and a2 does not intend), and the action called for at node 2 is 
the action that is the object o f the original proposed intention (drinking 
the toxin; a3 drinks but a4 does not drink). We stipulate furthermore that 
the outcomes are ranked by the agent as follows (where A IB ’ means A  is 
preferred to B’ and ‘A r rB’ means ‘A is much preferred to B’):
(Toxin): Oj - o4 i ot - o3 o2
(Toxin) says that the outcome o f forming an intention to drink the toxin 
and then proceeding with the target action is much preferred to the 
outcome o f the course o f action o f  never forming the intention in the 
first place, but that the outcome o f forming the intention and then not
302 Mariam Thalos
following through is most preferred o f all the outcomes available. Figure
2 presents the dilemma in node form:
1 intend 2 drink
+ sick
don’t intend \ don’t drink
0 0
timet < < time 2
Figure 2: Toxin Puzzle
On Kavka’s own view, the compound outcome o, - o4 (of action path at - a4: 
intend but don’t drink) is not rationally realizable, with full information o f 
the situation. And his conclusion is based on the principle (we might like 
to call it Kavka’s principle) that it is irrational to form an intention (plan) to 
perform an action that one knows ahead o f time one will have no reason 
whatever to follow through with (put slightly differently: one cannot 
formulate a plan that one knows in advance one will want to rescind or 
abrogate). And he held moreover that, this being the case, o, - o, (intend 
and drink) is likewise unrealizable for the rational agent. David Gauthier 
accepts Kavka’s principle, but denies that Oj - o3 (intend and drink) is, 
therefore, unrealizable. He maintains that it is precisely because o2 - o 
(intend but don’t drink) is genuinely unrealizable, that Oj - o3 (intend and 
drink) is indeed the most rational o f the agent’s options. And that this 
shows something very fundamental to the rationality o f  deliberation— 
namely, that the two principles Fve enumerated cannot always be 
satisfied together, and that the rational person must rank the principle 
o f separable choice below the principle o f maximal outcome.
4
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Degrees o f  freedom
The arresting— and trying—features o f  the toxin puzzle are better 
articulated by a slightly different case, representable again by the 
structure o f  Figure 1. In this case (Figure 3) we suppose that a certain 
agent 1 chooses at node 1, but that a second agent— agent 2— chooses at 
node 2. And suppose once again that
Oj - o4 f- o} - o3 }• )• o2
(where we can think o f  the two agents as agreeing on these preferences; 
suppose that they will share $2M upon successful completion o f a,, and 
only one o f them— prearranged in advance by a random device— is 
appointed to drink a poison goblet). Here the causal gap3 between a, 
(intend) and a3 (drink) is enormously widened. Without changing the 
relevant features (features o f the structure o f preferences and the time 
sequencing) o f  the dilemma, we have added degrees o f freedom by 
multiplying sites o f  agency.6
1 A intends 2 B drinks 
? ------------------------------------ ►f------------------------------------ ► $$$$ + B sick




Figure 3: Revised Toxin Puzzle
5 I am on record as not approving o f  causal language in connection with the events leading 
up to an action (Thalos 2007) but here it will save on effort to be terminologically sloppy.
6 Precisification o f  this idea, with applications to human sciences, is in Thalos (1999).
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In the modified scenario, the credentials o f the claim to the effect that
a, - a3 (A intends and B drinks) is unrealizable, are considerably better (a 
fact due to distribution the degrees o f freedom over more sites o f 
agency). And this now gives prominence to the crucial question of 
whether a} - a4 (A intends and B doesn’t drink) is realizable— and if not, 
why not? This issue turns simply on whether intention formation, as such 
and simply on its own, can be a target o f action in its own right. Can a 
rational agent form an intention for its own sake, and anticipate its 
demise without its having done any further work in the economy o f said 
agent’s corpus o f actions? In other words, can intentions, as such, be the 
targets o f deliberation?
I will leave this (very interesting) issue without attempting an answer. 
Note, however, that it is a much narrower issue than routinely taken to 
be. It is a question o f  what can be the target o f an episode of 
deliberation. Does it have bearing on questions o f whether it might be 
advisable or wise to follow through on a threat or promise? This is 
questionable {contra Gauthier 1994). And much less obvious is the 
bearing o f this matter on the further matter o f whether it is advisable or 
wise to issue threats or make promises. And much more questionable still 
is its bearing on whether an agent ought to adopt a policy o f following 
through on threats or promises. A great deal more by way o f analysis is 
required to illuminate the bearing o f the initial issue (of whether 
intentions can be targets o f deliberation) on further practical, moral and 
policy matters.
I collect in this paragraph some preliminary lessons o f our inquiry 
thus far. First: the idea that some capacity for planning makes one 
eligible o f certain types o f moral consideration is very questionable, if it 
turns out that for example the Venus flytrap qualifies as having planning 
capacities on a continuum with those displayed so prominently by 
primates. And if we should like to retain, at least as a postulate, that the 
capacity for complex planning o f the kind o f which at least some humans 
are capable at the zenith o f their mental powers, renders an entity 
eligible o f  certain kinds o f treatment, we shall have to justify this
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postulate by offering some reasons for rejecting the contrasting proposal 
that the capacity for simple planning— the capacity to have one’s efforts 
organized over time in a simple way as a matter o f  Nature’s outright 
gift— does not project the same moral profile. Second: the contention 
that analysis o f planning can bear upon the demands o f rationality too is 
questionable, and for the same reason: many entities are eligible o f 
membership in the category o f planners that don’t seem eligible o f 
membership in the category' o f conceptualizers or thinkers at all, let 
alone rational ones. The multitude o f ways and means by which one’s 
efforts can be organized over time, and the fact that different organisms 
can possess one form o f organization (or even several) but not others, 
suggests that this (very organic) quality o f being possessed o f 
organization may be quite distinct from, but continuous with, a capacity 
to reason about choice.
Finally, the proposals on which our observations cast some doubt, are 
got by taking an overly intellectualized conception o f planning, and 
furthermore one that (as we learn by and by) makes it impossible to 
study planning, as a feature o f agency, as a natural phenomenon in the 
biological regime. Accepting such an intellectualization o f  planning 
makes it seem as if being organized in one’s efforts is not part o f the 
natural order but in some way transcends it. And this is obviously 
incorrect. And when practical wisdom is conceived as something that 
transcends the natural order o f things, we lose the ability to integrate 
our considerations— moral and otherwise— for human agents, with our 
considerations for nonhuman entities.
Larger morals o f  the exercise
First important moral: calling upon principles alone, such as those 
displayed above, and turning the searchlight inward upon intuition for 
their affirmation or disaffirmation, does not result in resolution o f any 
substantive issues regarding what is called for in practical wisdom. One 
reason is that this procedure cannot by itself settle important matters 
with bearing on the substantive questions— such as the number o f
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degrees o f freedom in any given true-life scenario conforming to the 
bare-bones event structure in any given figure. For neither counting sites 
o f agency, nor counting nodes or forks, gives an accurate count o f the 
degrees o f  freedom. This is illustrated by the fact that, as we saw, Figures
2 and 3 have the same opportunity structure, but not the same agentic 
structure. Agentic structure cannot be captured by examining formal 
features only o f a decision problem. And this fact helps illuminate why 
refinement o f the Nash equilibrium solution concept, that we mentioned 
earlier in connection with separability, has now been abandoned by a 
preponderance o f game theorists.'
Further compounding this problem is the fact that the number o f 
degrees o f freedom is (at least sometimes) under the control o f  the 
entities occupying the sites designated or suggested in the figures: it is 
sometimes an agent’s prerogative to relinquish control via acquiescing in 
a certain control protocol, as we will discuss shortly. This is not to say 
that the agents in question do this voluntarily, or even that they 
relinquish responsibility for the outcome, as we will now discuss.
It might help here to make some further remarks about agentic 
structure, and the correlative notion o f a degree o f freedom. We have 
been working with the idea that (at least) one defining characteristic o f 
agency’ is aggregatabilitv: so entities on one scale o f organization can 
come together under some further ‘rules o f engagement’ or ‘protocol’ to 
form a (single) agent at a still higher scale, and likewise a higher-scale 
agency can disintegrate into numerous smaller-scale agencies. Agencies 
both coalesce and dissolve.8 Agency is thus, on the conception we are 
working with, a matter o f integration, and this is in turn a matter o f 
organization. A degree o f freedom, in the sense we will use the term 
here, does not amount to freedom in the ordinary sense— it is not simply
7 Don Ross, personal correspondence, puts the point this way: ‘there is no perspective in 
most games that embodies and consolidates into coherence the full cascade o f  interlocking 
agents’ beliefs’ .
8 Thus far I have defended this thesis only piecemeal in articles scattered across a range o f
journals, but a more coherent defense o f  this thesis is in progress.
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the capacity for putting some plan into action. Freedom in our
(technical) sense, and as physicists and engineers too use the term, is the
absence o f  (some) constraint upon magnitude. ,9 And the number o f degrees o f
freedom is thus a count o f  constraints that must be placed on a system to
achieve a full determination (or as full as nature will allow) o f  the
magnitude o f all its unconstrained quantities— in our case, behaviors.
This is a Systems conception o f freedom, because the number o f
unconstrained quantities is system-relative. This conception rests on the 
following ideas.
Definition DoF. X  is an independent quantity or a degree o f  freedom (dof) 
o f  a system a, according to a theory or scheme o f  representation T  = dfX  is 
named or othenvise designated by T  as belonging among those 
quantities whose magnitudes shape the state o f  a.
In this definition the notion o f shaping is used primitively, and is taken 
as governed by the following axiom:
Axiom DoF. If a quantity X shapes the state o f  a system a, or if it gives 
shape to a quantity Y o f a, then it is false that X  is given shape to by 
any other quantity.
We can apply these ideas in decision situations, as follows:
Definition Decision DoF. Some factor or entity (for example, a
choosing ‘atom’ or ‘molecule’) is a degree o f freedom in a
deciding/acting system S, according to decision theory DT, if and
only i f  it is among those factors designated by DT as shaping the 
behavior o f  S.
Now, when we count the number o f degrees o f freedom in, for example, 
a decisional system— a system in which the outcome depends on I  
(potentially interdependent) network o f  decisions—we are positively not
9 For a great deal more on this contrast, as well as how we shall have to refine the
Z  7  bnng t0g6ther 311 thC SCienCeS int°  3 Cohercnt P 'cture. Thalos (1999) and Nonreductive Materialism Without Hierarchy,’ in progress.
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looking at the capacities for action on the parts o f decision makers 
involved. We are looking, instead, at the numbers o f uncontrolled, 
unconstrained or unknown decision-relevant factors that can swing the 
system towards one set o f behaviors rather than another. Contrariwise, 
the degree o f control in such a system is directly proportional to the 
exercise o f what we may refer to as social functioning withm that system 
the exercise o f (learned) capacities for smooth social and decisional
interaction (social ‘flow’).
Recall the example o f flocking we discussed above. That example too 
can be handled very well with these conceptual tools. Flocking needs to 
be very finely-tuned to achieve a particular end. Close behavioral 
coupling among near neighbors in a flock allows a localized change in 
direction to be amplified and propagated across the flock. This allows 
each flock member to influence and be influenced by flockmates much 
farther away than their local neighborhood— it gives each a much larger 
‘effective perceptual range’ than their actual sensory range. This scaling 
is nonlinear. Study o f the details o f the scaling relations reveals that it is 
hard for groups to maintain cohesion if the coupling distance is too 
short. Longer-range transfer o f information is enabled by increasing the 
coupling distance. Increasing the coupling distance further still creates a 
cohesive group, but ‘misinformation’ might be propagated (as use o f 
information about motion o f distant individuals is in some circumstances
less beneficial locally).
In addition, coupling may be moderated by context-dependence. For 
example, if individuals conditioned reactions upon context (under 
threat, for example, aligning more strongly with distant flockmates, 
thereby increasing system gain ), this could allow for some flexibility, but 
there is a cost. Heightening sensitivity to weak or ambiguous 
environmental signals increases susceptibility to ‘false positives’, just as 
damping response to local fluctuations in less threatening contexts 
increases ‘false negatives’ . And so a balance has to be struck:
Under different circumstances individuals may adopt behaviour that
facilitates collective damping o f local fluctuations. During long-distance
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migration, for example, animals are often faced with the challenge o f 
navigating up noisy and weak thermal or resource gradients. Local variability 
makes this task difficult, or even impossible, for individuals in isolation. But 
coherent interactions can allow groups o f organisms to function like an 
integrated self-organizing array o f sensors, again increasing effective 
perceptual range. As long as intereactions are sufficiently sensitive to ensure 
cohesion, but not too sensitive to local fluctuations and individual error, 
individuals can effectively respond to the weak long-range gradient (from 
Couzin 2007; cf. Couzin and Krause 2003, as well as Couzin, et. a l, 2005).
And so a flock o f hundreds o f organisms, operating under a given set o f 
‘rules o f engagement’, is decidedly not a system with degrees o f freedom 
on the order o f  hundreds or more (as a count o f the behaving ‘sites’ 
would have suggested): it is instead a system with something on the 
order o f a dozen degrees, counting among them rough size, coupling 
distance, and level o f context-sensivity, as well as environmental 
variables that tend to couple with these features. A flock is an entity with 
a reduced number o f  degrees o f  freedom than there would be without 
the rules o f  engagement. And these degrees o f freedom will be revealed 
as we study (and model) the dynamics o f their behavior. It is not a matter 
o f  decisional nodes, forks or sites.
Bringing this point back home: humans too (specifically in their 
capacities as agents) operate with ‘rules o f  engagement’, some more local 
than others. And these tend to reduce the number o f  degrees o f freedom 
from what they would have been without the ‘rules’. Reductions in 
degrees o f  freedom between rational decision makers, for example in 
the interests o f coordination, moves the decision ‘atoms’ closer in the 
direction o f  a flock. And which variables function as the degrees o f 
freedom will vary according to the specifics o f the system (whether, 
among many things that matter, it is composed entirely o f  adults, or 
equals, and how far from each other they might be).
But what can settle the substantive matter as to the number o f  degrees 
o f  freedom? There are three ways to go with this question:
1. Assum e that to every body/center o f  consciousness there corresponds one 
degree o f  freedom or agent;
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2. Decree that the situation (the opportunity or event structure) shall settle 
the question o f  the number o f  degrees o f  freedom, given as collateral 
information or ‘boundary conditions’;
3. Assume nothing, allowing that even the number o f  degrees o f  freedom 
could be a matter to be determined by the solution process.
How to proceed with this question is profoundly important to the 
analysis o f agency. The first way simply announces ex cathedra an 
individualistic doctrine on agency. (It is typically inspired by a 
transcendental stance on the topic.) The second way takes the facts o f 
agency to be predetermined in advance by possibly empirical, but 
ultimately non-strategic facts on the ground. The third way allows 
agency to be negotiable within the ‘decision game’, the ‘game o f practical 
wisdom.’ (Decision theorists originally thought that these too are games, 
and could be appropriate handled endogenously, but they are coming to 
realize that not all matters can be settled endogenously. Hence the 
abandonment o f Nash Equilibrium program.)
And so the choice among these three can hardly be settled a priori. 
Still, the choice is important to the metaphysics o f agency. Analysis o f 
practical wisdom makes progress only in proportion to how well it 
conceptualizes the metaphysics o f agency, and taxonomizes such 
agencies as it encounters in nature in ways that go substantially beyond 
what is given in the event structures displayed in these abstract figures, 
in true-life problems faced by true-life, flesh-and-blood agents.
The second important moral: selection o f methodology (3) above 
goes hand in hand with making room for an evolutionary' account o f the 
units o f agency. In other words, it leaves room for exploring whether 
evolutionary forces can have had some impact upon the constellation o f 
agency structures we find on the ground, whereas selection o f 
methodology (2)— and obviously o f (1)—waives all attempts at such an 
exploration.
The third and perhaps most important moral: the units o f agency 
issue—the question o f whether there is a unit o f  agency that is most
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fundamental or independent, such that other units o f agency are in 
some way dependent upon it— is tightly interwoven with questions 
concerning the nature and types o f  goal attainment/planning strategies, 
and how they might emerge in the course o f natural history. And in that 
way both questions bear on the choice o f principles for rational decision 
we have briefly reviewed above. For example, if it should turn out that 
front-loading is the most vigorous, most effective or most efficient o f all 
goal attainment strategies, we should expect to find more ‘local’ than 
‘distributed’ agency structures in nature. And accordingly we should also 
accept a certain principle o f  separable choice as a principle o f  rational 
decision.
I favor methodology 3. Not only does it make room for exploration 
o f  questions about the units o f  agency and goal attainment strategies, 
within an evolutionary setting, but it also urges these questions as 
important and fundamental to an inherently interdisciplinary enterprise 
o f studying agency. It prompts for a natural history o f the units o f 
agency we find in nature. And it makes it clear that a natural history is 
both necessary and desirable for purposes o f  an account o f  moral 
agency.
Principles, again
What support can we offer the principles o f choice (maximization or 
separability) displayed above, short o f  appeals to intuition or to other 
principles that might support them?
One untried approach is to inquire what practical wisdom might 
dictate in those instances where foresight (full information) is 
unavailable—where for example long-term consequences cannot be 
clearly predicted. So, for example, rather than focusing upon the T2 o f  
T„.2, what if we should focus instead upon the T , o f T t.2. Is there a 
working-forward principle, as contrasted with a working-backwards 
principle? It would be extremely useful to work out such an account, for 
a host o f  reasons:
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1. There is very often precious little to go on in the way o f long­
term information.
2. Mistakes are inevitable. How does one move forward from 
having made a mistake within a plan?
3. Not only are mistakes inevitable, but so is maturation. We are 
entities that follow well-established developmental trajectories. 
How do we accommodate the inevitable yet uncertain changes 
that will come, particularly when at the original stage o f 
development there is precious little in the way o f practical 
wisdom to support them?
Another approach is to take the structures one at a time, and to 
determine whether there might be principles that govern structures 
much more individually. This is a local, as contrasted with a global, 
approach. So, in the structure o f Figure 1, we might propose this, as a 
principle o f high generality:
If o2 f-f- oJ - o3 \ Oj - o4, then S(T1.2) = {a2}
no matter how many sites o f agency are in play. This principle might 
seem to follow from the principle o f  maximal outcomes. (But perhaps it 
does not follow straightforwardly, since in this principle we are 
aggregating outcomes o} - o3 and o, - o4. ) Ariel we would have to think the 
matter over carefully, and for different numbers (and kinds) o f sites o f 
agency, once we departed from this very simple structure.
Metaphysics and development: the tangled webs we weave
The reasons enumerated in the last section, in favor o f seeking forwards- 
working principles, indicate that a good deal has been left out o f the 
analysis o f practical wisdom and planning thus far, for example:
(1) Who is the agent, and how do the dilemmas hang together for 
them (how far ahead can they project their decision trees)? This
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matter concerns issues surrounding how to represent the 
information at their disposal faithfully;
(2) What developmental stage have the agent ‘sites’ in question 
achieved? This question has bearing on the matter o f the level o f 
organization within their reach; and this, in turn, will have a 
bearing on what combinations o f  actions are realizable. If for 
some (highly mature) agents, certain combinations o f actions are 
unrealizable, it is similarly true that for other (much less mature) 
agents, other— different— combinations are unrealizable. For 
example, some agents do not respond to threats, however 
credible, just as they do not respond to promises either; this is 
not obviously a failure o f any kind, and a failure o f rationality in 
particular, especially when we take into account the fact that 
public knowledge o f  such incapacities can, and often does, work 
in favor o f such an agent.10 And too whether it will work in their 
favor depends on who they are interacting with, as much as what 
is at stake for them and for others. Similarly, some agents 
(notably, the younger set) do not follow easily through with 
promises, threats or even plans. And this can certainly work in 
their favor (as ever)' parent knows). The toxin puzzle is a case in 
point: an agent so organized as to be capable o f forming 
genuine intentions that they can foresee rescinding, will be in 
the happy position o f being able to realize a, - a4
By the same token, one can ask whether there are considerations 
besides outcomes that are taken into account by the agent or agents in 
question, and how these considerations, when taken into account by the 
relevant agents, bear on the questions we have already canvassed. So, 
suppose that someone is moved by (so-called) moral considerations in 
favor o f  promise-keeping. Does this create a situation in which certain 
combinations o f actions are in a relevant sense not realizable for them?
10 Schelling (1960) makes a good deal— and good use— o f this point.
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And by the same token, suppose that certain other folks are not moved 
very much by such considerations. Might this not open up options for 
them that will not be open to other agents under the very same 
circumstances?
It is not at all obvious what we must say about such matters, from the 
stance o f a theory o f goal attainment and deliberation. But these 
questions are, and now clearly, pertinent.
Toxin, again
Thomas Schelling famously brought such questions as we have just 
reviewed to prominent attention. Others— like Edward McClennen and 
David Gauthier— have sought to address such questions. All without 
articulating any account o f the bearing o f metaphysics o f agency on 
decision or other organizational questions. They have sought to take 
metaphysics off stage. And their accounts suffer for it: easy 
counterexamples to their principles can be had simply through changing 
and juggling degrees o f freedom.
One way o f seeing that this stratagem o f altering the degrees o f 
freedom will bring any principle down, is to notice how it can easily take 
down even the principle o f maximal outcomes. Again take the structure 
o f Figure 1 and suppose that:
Oj - 04 \ O j- 03 f l  02.
The principle o f maximal outcome would insist that S(T1.2) = {a / - ci4}. 
.And we know that a very worthy counterexample is Kavka’s very own 
toxin case: a case with that structure but where the degrees o f freedom 
between - a4 is reduced to something less than the 2 that the structure 
would suggest.
Someone might be tempted to complain that this counterexample 
works simply because it shows that a certain stratagem is not realizable. 
And so it works by displaying that the structure o f Figure 1 is an 
inappropriate representation o f the decision problem. But this 
complaint only serves to provoke the response that my criticism can be
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put in different terms, without altering its bite. This is that decision 
trees, as such, are— contrary to how they are often depicted— inadequate 
representations o f the true-life dilemmas: trees leave out the all- 
important metaphysics. But this is the very same criticism as mine, put in 
different words.
Metaphysics, the final frontier: The dimensions o f  agencies
How do sites o f  agency coalesce? They do so along a variety o f  different 
dimensions. The first and most obvious is that agency can bring together 
control over a certain array o f resources; when this occurs so, we can 
speak o f a pool o f  resources. I will refer to this as the zeroeth dimension o f 
combination or merger. And I will offer (what I like to think o f  as) a 
Lego model o f agent formation. The zeroeth dimension is the 
emergence o f  a unit Lego block.
Second, and also very familiar, sites o f agency can combine along 
different life slices and developmental stages o f the same organism; 
when they do, we speak o f an individual. This I will refer to as the vertical 
dimension o f  merger, conceiving o f time as advancing upwards. 
Individuals will be represented by towers consisting o f  unit pieces.
Finally, and most controversially, sites o f  agency located in different 
organisms can coalesce (among members o f  the same species, but also 
across species boundaries, as when a human being trains a companion 
animal for hunting or herding); when they do, we speak o f coalitions. I 
will refer to this as the horizontal dimension, conceiving o f coalitions as 
overlaps or unions in the horizontal plane. In the Lego model, a 
coalition is a multi-unit block that joins more than one tower. Enduring 
coalitions will consist o f multi-unit towers rising vertically from the point 
o f merger.
The natural history o f alliance and merger will seek answers to 
questions o f  the form: Are alliances more fit than single towers? How do 
short-term alliances fare against longer-lived ones? Which are the most 
stable forms and patterns o f merger? How do networks o f alliances 
interact with other networks? Are there universal properties we should
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expect to see in large networks o f alliance? And what happens when we 
move up the size scale? Do we at some point get a ‘phase change’— do we 
encounter points at which ‘phase’ changes, conceived as quantum 
changes in some behavioral variable, occur? These questions, obviously, 
are beyond the scope o f this essay, but they suggest a new realm of 
scientific inquiry that has been sorely neglected.
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